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Hitting the Sweet Spot by Accident:                         
How Recent Lower Court Cases Help Realign 
Incentives in the Credit Rating Industry 
JOHN CRAWFORD∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Broad reliance on excessively optimistic credit ratings of structured 
financial products1 helped ignite and spread the recent financial crisis.  A 
misalignment of incentives at rating agencies such as Fitch Inc., Moody’s 
Corporation, and Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) contributed significantly to 
this excessive optimism.  One proposal for better aligning incentives is to 
facilitate more lawsuits against the rating agencies for shoddy work.  
Courts have traditionally dismissed such lawsuits, deeming ratings to be 
fully protected speech under the First Amendment.  However, two recent 
district court cases, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co.,2 and In re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Investment 
Litigation,3 adopt a different view.  They hold that ratings on securities 
sold in private placements, as distinct from public offerings, do not 
constitute matters of public concern, and do not qualify for full First 
Amendment protection.  Many of the structured finance products at the 
heart of the financial crisis were sold in private placements, while most 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School.  I am grateful to Michael Klausner for extremely 
helpful feedback, and to Courtney Scala and the editors of CONNtemplations for fast and first-rate 
editing.  Many thanks to Olivia for all her support. 
1 “Structured finance” refers to the issuance by bankruptcy-remote, special-purpose entities of 
securities with graduated repayment priorities.  The special purpose entities are in turn collateralized by 
assets such as mortgages or credit card receivables. 
2 No. 08-CV-7508, 2009 WL 2828018, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009). 
3 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
 14 CONNtemplations [Vol. 42:13 
corporate debt is sold in public offerings.  This Essay argues that in the 
structured finance arena, the costs of facilitating litigation against the 
rating agencies are lower, and the potential benefits greater, than in 
traditional corporate finance.  Irrespective of constitutional merits, good 
economic policy may prescribe facilitating lawsuits in structured finance 
but not in traditional corporate finance.  By happy coincidence, the 
holdings in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and National Century 
approximate this result. 
II.  HOW INFLATED RATINGS FED THE CRISIS 
Ratings pervade the architecture of debt markets.  A raft of federal 
regulations restrict what securities banks and various investment vehicles 
may hold based on credit ratings.4  Most investment funds have internal 
guidelines that impose further ratings-based restrictions on fund managers.5  
These restrictions aim to limit the risk that banks or fund managers 
assume.  They help address the danger that a fund manager will increase 
his or her compensation by imposing unwanted risk on investors, or that a 
bank will impose unwanted risk on depositors and the deposit insurer. 
Sufficiently high ratings from an approved agency6 are prerequisites to 
the broad salability of most debt instruments.  Ratings allow mortgage 
lenders—directly or through third-party arrangers—to securitize claims on 
mortgages that will pay out over a number of years (if all goes well) and 
sell them for upfront cash, which they can then re-lend, starting the process 
anew.  Securities sold against pools of home mortgages are called 
residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”).  RMBS are issued in a 
hierarchy of “tranches,” with repayment priority for higher-rated tranches.  
Mid- and lower-level RMBS tranches are often pooled with other RMBS 
and/or securities from other structured financial products, and 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) are sold against this pool, again 
in a hierarchy of tranches.  CDOs were essential to an active RMBS 
market, as the CDOs were the primary purchasers of the lower-rated 
RMBS tranches; without the sale of the most junior, “first-loss” tranches of 
securitized pools of assets, most deals could not go forward.7 
High ratings on RMBS and CDOs contributed to a high degree of 
liquidity in the mortgage market; overly optimistic ratings contributed to 
                                                                                                                          
4 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 690–703 (1999). 
5 Richard Cantor et al., The Use of Credit Ratings in Investment Management in the US and 
Europe (Working Paper Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996133. 
6 An “approved agency” is one recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”). 
7 See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings 
Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 69–72 
(Working Paper May 14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475. 
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excessive liquidity, as investors were willing to fund mortgages at rates 
that fell far short of compensating them for the actual risk.  This helped 
feed the real estate bubble. 
When the bubble burst, the breakdown in investor confidence in 
ratings helped the crisis spread to the broader financial system.  The 
highest rated RMBS and CDO tranches constituted what Gary Gorton has 
termed “informationally insensitive” debt, or debt that “is very liquid 
because its value rarely changes and so . . . can be traded without fear that 
some people have secret information about the value of the debt.”8  Debt 
obligations with the highest agency ratings were viewed as informationally 
insensitive, or safe. 
When the crisis hit, there were approximately 37,000 structured 
finance tranches in the United States with AAA ratings (the highest 
possible rating).9  These highly rated securities helped lubricate the broader 
economy as institutions used them as collateral in a variety of transactions.  
Perhaps most importantly, institutions with large temporary cash surpluses 
would, instead of depositing the money in a commercial bank (where 
deposit insurance was capped prior to the crisis at $100,000 per account), 
lend the money to other financial institutions with short-term cash needs, 
and accept AAA-rated RMBS and CDO securities, inter alia, as collateral.  
These loans—called repurchase (“repo”) agreements—were usually for a 
single night, but could be rolled over indefinitely by mutual consent.  They 
were viewed as risk-free, with rates of return essentially equal to that of 
Treasury bills.  Estimates of the size of the repo market before the crisis 
were as high as $10 trillion.10  It constituted a parallel (unregulated) 
banking system as large as the commercial banking system.  For it to work 
smoothly, collateral had to be informationally insensitive—parties could 
not spend time worrying about its value.  When home prices started falling, 
investors saw risk where previously they had seen only safety in highly 
rated mortgage-backed securities.  They hoarded cash and stopped rolling 
over repo loans.  Investors knew the system was insolvent, but information 
about the location of losses—which securities were toxic and to what 
degree—was startlingly opaque.11  Suddenly, the value of AAA-rated 
securities became highly informationally sensitive, but no one possessed 
the relevant information.  “Not only [did] information now have to be 
produced, but the expertise [was] lacking”12—and this because of the prior 
                                                                                                                          
8 Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at 4 
(Yale Sch. Mgmt. Working Paper, May 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401882. 
9 Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance 3–4 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin. Working 
Paper No. 09-060, Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287363. 
10 Gorton, supra note 8, at 30. 
11 See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic 1 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 08-25, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1276047. 
12 Gorton, supra note 8, at 37. 
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heavy reliance on what turned out to be highly flawed ratings. 
Thus began a “run” on the parallel banking system—the refusal to roll 
over repo loans was the functional equivalent of depositor withdrawals—
with all the adverse systemic consequences of previous banking crises.  
Indeed, the consequences were worse, as ratings-based rules and capital 
requirements forced institutions to sell securities into illiquid markets, 
driving down prices, which forced other institutions to mark down the 
value of comparable securities and to hold their own fire sales to maintain 
required capital ratios, feeding a vicious cycle. 
III.  HOW THE RATING AGENCIES GOT IT WRONG 
The ratings agencies’ errors in rating mortgage-backed securities 
contributed to and exacerbated the crisis.  How did they get things so 
wrong?  In contrast to the more qualitative judgments about credit risk 
applied to corporate issuers, agencies relied primarily on statistical models 
in rating structured financial instruments.13  In hindsight, the rating 
agencies fed the models unrealistically optimistic assumptions about 
continuing house price appreciation, the probability of borrower defaults, 
and correlation among defaults.14  In corporate finance, a rating error on 
one firm is unlikely to be replicated in the analysis of other firms, as 
analysis focuses on the idiosyncratic risks of the individual business.  In 
structured finance, however, models are applied to whole classes of 
issuances, and model error affected the ratings on broad swaths of 
securities. 
Why did they make such unrealistic assumptions?  Critics point to a 
conflict of interest at the core of the business model of the major rating 
agencies: they rate debt as a service to investors, but issuers pay their 
bills.15   Issuers have a strong incentive to attain the highest possible rating, 
as higher ratings decrease the perceived risk of default, thus raising the 
price that investors will pay for the debt.  Due to the payment structure, it 
is possible that rating agencies may bow to issuers’ pressure to inflate 
ratings in order to keep their business. 
In theory, rating agencies resist this pressure because of the desire to 
maintain a good reputation: if investors no longer trust rating agencies, 
they will not pay a premium for more highly rated securities, and issuers 
will have no incentive to pay to attain those ratings.  Compromising quality 
standards today will harm the rating agencies’ business in the long run.  
                                                                                                                          
13 See, e.g., Mason & Rosner, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that “structured-finance rating analysis 
is essentially driven by statistical analysis”). 
14 See Coval et al., supra note 9, at 2–4, 17 (explaining errors made when utilizing the models). 
15 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE 
COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 23 (July 2008), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf. 
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This explanation carries some force, but two factors significantly attenuate 
the reputation mechanism.  First, as outlined above, many securities 
require ratings for target investors to be able to buy them.  Critics believe 
that rating agencies’ primary function now is to provide regulatory licenses 
for the sale of securities, rather than to serve as reputational 
intermediaries.16  In this view, reputation provides no meaningful 
constraint on the rating agencies, as demand will remain stable and they 
will continue to profit regardless of the accuracy of their ratings.  A 2008 
Wall Street Journal editorial asked, “How badly do the major credit-rating 
firms have to perform before investors stop using their services?  That’s a 
trick question, because investors aren’t allowed to stop using them.”17 
The second factor working against reputation as a bulwark against the 
deterioration of rating quality is the tension between long-term and short-
term incentives within the firms.  It can take a long time for poor ratings 
quality to become apparent.  A former Moody’s managing director 
explains, “It is argued that building a stellar reputation requires a long-term 
horizon and view.  Yet managers of publicly owned rating agencies are 
subject to intense short-term pressure to demonstrate earnings growth.  It 
takes tremendous discipline to turn away business, particularly when 
competitors are building market share.”18 
There is anecdotal evidence that rating agencies did not always 
exercise this discipline.  According to notes subpoenaed for congressional 
hearings, Moody’s chief executive officer stated at one internal 
presentation that Moody’s employees “‘are continually pitched by bankers, 
issuers, investors’ and sometimes ‘we drink the kool-aid.’”19  In another 
internal town hall meeting, he stated: 
“What happened in ’04 and ’05 with respect to subordinated 
tranches is that our competition, Fitch and S&P, went nuts.  
Everything was investment grade.  It didn’t really matter. . . .  
We tried to alert the market.  We said we’re not rating it.  
This stuff isn’t investment grade.  No one cared . . . .”20 
Issuers exploited their position as paying customers by seeking out 
                                                                                                                          
16 See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 681–703.  Note that until recently it was next to impossible to 
attain NRSRO status—the major credit rating agencies were all “grandfathered” in.  The Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 and subsequent rule changes have eased the process.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
240.17g-1.  There are now ten firms with the official designation, but under the regulatory license view, 
this is unlikely to improve accuracy. 
17 Editorial, The Ratings Racket, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2008, at A14. 
18 Jerome Fons, White Paper on Rating Competition and Structured Finance 2 (Fons Risk 
Solutions, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.fonsrisksolutions.com/Documents/Ratings% 
20White%20Paper.pdf. 
19 Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. 
Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) (quoting statements made by Ray 
McDaniel, CEO of Moody’s). 
20 Id. 
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agencies whose models most liberally assigned top ratings and channeling 
business to them.  Two trends made this “ratings shopping”21 more severe 
in structured finance than in corporate finance: issuers’ willingness to 
eschew the services of Moody’s or S&P for Fitch, and their willingness to 
use one rater rather than two,22 as is the norm in corporate finance.23  
Raters are likely to be more sensitive to issuers’ concerns if issuers can 
plausibly threaten not to use their services.  For large public offerings, 
Moody’s and S&P usually preempt such shopping by assigning unsolicited 
ratings.24  This is impossible to do for most private placements, where key 
information is nonpublic.  Rating shopping, combined with the conflict of 
interest inherent in the issuer-pays model, contributed to a systemic 
inflation of ratings on structured products, which in turn contributed to 
both the real estate bubble and the pernicious consequences of its bursting. 
IV.  ONE WAY TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINE ON RATING AGENCIES 
One way to impose discipline on rating agencies is to expose them to 
liability for shoddy work.  If the desire to please clients and win business 
inspires excessive optimism, the threat of lawsuits for failing to base 
ratings on sound analysis can push in the opposite direction.  The costs and 
benefits of such lawsuits weigh differently in structured finance than in 
traditional corporate finance.  Rating agencies’ conflict of interest is more 
severe in structured finance, as losing a client has a bigger impact on 
profits.  In 2006, structured finance accounted for forty-four percent of 
Moody’s business, while traditional corporate finance accounted for just 
thirty-two percent.25  In corporate finance, thousands of distinct issuers 
contribute to the revenue stream, and losing any one of them would not 
cause serious harm to the bottom line.  In structured finance, a dozen big 
banks dominate the market.26  Incurring the disfavor of one of these banks 
could significantly harm profits, especially as an issuer’s threat to take its 
business elsewhere carries more force in structured finance.  Further, to the 
degree that information is more often private and the models complex in 
structured finance, it may take longer for investors to realize ratings errors, 
which could exacerbate the short-term outlook of rating agency decision-
                                                                                                                          
21 See ANDREW CARRON ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, CREDIT RATINGS FOR STRUCTURED 
PRODUCTS 31–32 (2003), available at http://www.nera.com/image/6384.pdf (discussing distribution of 
credit ratings by degree of subordination and the idea of “ratings shopping”). 
22 See id. at Exhibit III.2. (showing an increase in the number of ratings using only one rating 
agency instead of a combination of two or more). 
23 See John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
286–87 (2006) (discussing examples of industry-accepted rating systems used in corporate finance). 
24 Carol Ann Frost, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence 
on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies 20 (unpublished working paper, on file with Univ. North Texas; 
State Univ. New York at Buffalo, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904077. 
25 Coval et al., supra note 9, at 4. 
26 Mason & Rosner, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
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makers.  In structured finance, it is easier for rating agencies to hide 
manipulative practices, at least in the short run, which translates to a bigger 
market failure that litigation might address. 
The primary cost of permitting suits to go forward is that any 
downgrade would presumably invite a lawsuit, however frivolous.  This 
could lead to excessive conservatism in ratings and delays in downgrades.  
The effect of litigation on systemic accuracy, then, is ambiguous.  In 
structured finance, however, this poses less serious concerns, as investors 
are overwhelmingly sophisticated institutions that would be unlikely to 
team with plaintiffs’ attorneys to launch frivolous suits. 
In short, the reputational mechanism is weaker in structured finance 
than in traditional corporate finance, the conflicts of interest are more 
severe, and litigation costs are lower.  All of these factors make exposure 
to lawsuits by investors more appropriate in structured finance than in 
corporate finance. 
V.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RECENT CASES 
Lawsuits against rating agencies have traditionally faced a formidable 
barrier: the First Amendment.  Courts have accepted rating agencies’ 
arguments that their ratings are opinions on matters of public concern, and 
are fully protected speech under the First Amendment, subject to the 
“actual malice” exception.27 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and National Century, however, depart 
from this traditional deference to ratings.  They hold that ratings on 
instruments sold in private placements, because they are published to a 
limited group of targeted investors instead of to the world at large, do not 
constitute matters of “public concern,” and hence do not qualify for full 
First Amendment protection.28  In practice, this means that plaintiffs need 
not show actual malice, but may, for example, sue for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Both decisions rely on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders.29  In Dun & Bradstreet, a credit 
reporting agency30 erroneously sent five subscribing banks a confidential 
report that a small local business had filed for bankruptcy.  The business 
                                                                                                                          
27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).  “Actual malice” is a legal 
term of art that translates to knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for whether a statement is true 
or false.  Id. 
28 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 08-CV-7508, 2009 WL 
2828018, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
640 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
29 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). 
30 Credit reporting agencies are distinct from credit rating agencies.  They collect and report the 
credit histories of individuals and smaller businesses—entities likely to seek financing from a bank 
rather than the capital markets. They do not issue opinions on the creditworthiness of corporate bonds 
or structured financial instruments. 
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sued for defamation.31  The Court rejected Dun & Bradstreet’s First 
Amendment defense, holding that because its report was made available on 
a confidential basis to a small number of paying subscribers, it was not a 
matter of public concern.32  Dun & Bradstreet could be held liable, 
therefore, even without a showing of actual malice. 
One should note that Dun & Bradstreet is not necessarily dispositive of 
First Amendment arguments by rating agencies in the context of private 
placements.  Privately placed bonds are generally sold to institutions 
representing thousands of small investors, making them more a matter of 
public concern than the solvency of a small local company.  Further, 
ratings on the bonds, while published in documents sent only to targeted 
investors, are not confidential; a concerned party could ascertain such 
ratings with relative ease.  Dun & Bradstreet also made a factual statement 
that was demonstrably false and harmful to its subject’s reputation; the 
rating agencies in these cases issued opinions that, in retrospect, were not 
harmful enough to their subjects’ reputations.  Nonetheless, Dun & 
Bradstreet is essential to the courts’ conclusions in Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank and National Century. 
A.  Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
In Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, two institutional investors sued 
Moody’s, S&P, Morgan Stanley, and several other institutions involved in 
the arrangement, marketing, and management of a structured investment 
vehicle (“SIV”) called the Cheyne SIV.33  An SIV typically buys CDOs, 
RMBS, and other asset-backed securities with long maturities, and issues 
short-term notes to investors.  Because longer-term assets are viewed as 
relatively riskier and thus demand higher interest rates, SIVs profit from 
the difference in interest rates between their long-term assets and their 
short-term liabilities.  The SIV market essentially disappeared with the 
onset of the financial crisis. 
According to the allegations in this case, the selling documents for the 
Cheyne SIV listed the rating agencies’ responsibilities.  These 
responsibilities included active monitoring of the SIV and approval 
authority for changes to the SIV’s portfolio.  Two specific responsibilities 
were to ensure the SIV’s rated notes “would be supported by at least forty 
percent ‘AAA’—and at least sixty percent ‘AA’—collateral assets,” and 
that “the amount of RMBS supporting the Cheyne SIV would never exceed 
fifty-five percent.”34 
The complaint further alleged that S&P and Moody’s received larger-
                                                                                                                          
31 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751–52. 
32 Id. at 762. 
33 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 2009 WL 2828018, at *1. 
34 Id. at *4. 
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than-usual fees for the deal and knew the fees were contingent on the 
provision of sufficiently high ratings.35  The plaintiffs also claimed that 
shortly before they bought notes from the Cheyne SIV, S&P and Moody’s 
both came out with new “models that eased . . . standards for evaluating 
the creditworthiness of nonprime securities like the Cheyne SIV.”36  
Perhaps most damning, the rating agencies allegedly sat idly by as RMBS 
came to make up more than fifty-five percent of the Cheyne SIV portfolio, 
and AAA- and AA-rated assets both fell below the thresholds promised in 
the selling documents.37 
After the Cheyne SIV failed in 2007, the plaintiffs brought claims for, 
inter alia, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and common law fraud 
against S&P, Moody’s, and the other defendants.38  Because the court’s 
ruling was in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it assumed that all the 
allegations were true in determining whether the claims could go forward.  
The court ruled that New York’s Martin Act39 barred all private securities-
related claims that “do not require proof of deceitful intent.”40  So, for 
example, private litigants in New York can press state law securities fraud 
claims, but only the state attorney general can pursue a negligence claim in 
a securities case.  The court thus dismissed every claim except for common 
law fraud against the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley.41 
Relying on Dun & Bradstreet, the court rejected the rating agencies’ 
claim to full First Amendment protection.  It reasoned that because ratings 
were published only in documents distributed to a limited number of target 
investors, they were not a matter of public concern.  The rating agencies 
could thus be held liable for damages without a showing of actual malice.42  
The court’s ruling on this issue was arguably unnecessary, as the only 
claim to survive its order, common law fraud, requires showing “the 
defendant possesses an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”43  
Because such intent would entail knowledge of falsity, it should 
automatically trigger the “actual malice” exception to First Amendment 
protection.  The First Amendment would not protect the rating agencies 
against a fraud claim even for publicly issued ratings.  Nonetheless, the 
court’s decision is sure to have an impact on other cases that involve 
allegations of negligence or negligent misrepresentation on the part of the 
rating agencies—perhaps even cases brought by New York’s Attorney 
                                                                                                                          
35 Id. at *3. 
36 Id. at *11. 
37 Id. at *4. 
38 Id. at *1. 
39 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c (1996). 
40 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 2009 WL 2828018, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 The Martin Act was only one basis for the dismissal of the other claims.  The court also, for 
example, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract on other grounds.  Id. at *19. 
42 Id. at *9. 
43 Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22 CONNtemplations [Vol. 42:13 
General. 
B.  National Century 
The litigation in National Century pre-dated the financial crisis.  It 
arose out of a massive fraud at the Ohio-based National Century Financial 
Enterprises, Inc., which collapsed in 2002.44  The company provided loans 
to healthcare providers to cover the period between patient treatment and 
reimbursement by third-party insurers.45  In a structure akin to RMBS, it 
packaged these loans into (supposedly) bankruptcy-remote vehicles, which 
then issued notes to investors secured by the healthcare loan receivables.46  
The vehicle at issue in this case, NPF XII, sold separate series of privately 
placed notes over time.  Lloyds TSB Bank PLC purchased notes in a series 
rated by Moody’s, and a group of New York-based public pension funds 
(with Lloyds, the “plaintiffs”) purchased notes in a series rated by Fitch.47  
After the notes defaulted, the plaintiffs sued the rating agencies separately, 
and the cases were consolidated. The judge’s decision was an order in 
response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by the rating agencies.48 
The plaintiffs’ suit against the agencies included claims of fraud, 
aiding and abetting fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, inter alia.49  
The plaintiffs claimed that both rating agencies had access to information 
that should have alerted them to National Century’s noncompliance with 
the terms in its Master Indenture, and that would have undermined the high 
ratings they had assigned to the NPF XII notes.50  The plaintiffs claimed, 
for instance, that Fitch received three anonymous letters outlining the fraud 
at National Century, but after an investigation determined the letters were 
baseless.51 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of fraud 
because they did not plead with sufficient particularity.52  As fraud was the 
only claim likely to qualify for the actual malice exception, the court’s 
ruling on the agencies’ First Amendment defense was crucial to the 
survival of the lawsuit.  The court found “that the complaint [did] not 
                                                                                                                          
44 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former National Century Financial Enterprises CEO Sentenced 
to 30 Years in Prison, Co-Owner Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Conspiracy, Fraud and Money 
Laundering (Mar. 27, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-crm-282.html. 
45 David Hammer, Former Executives of Loan Company Charged with Fraud, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE, May 23, 2006. 
46 See Harold L. Kaplan & Stephanie Wickouski, Health Care Financing and Securitization After 
National Century, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2003, available at http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/ 
files/Publication/d5263820-0353-4db6-abbd-3a818e490977/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
0bb58994-e659-4d3b-8bec-361d2fb1e32d/HCFinancingAfterNationalCenturyABIArticleMay03.pdf. 
47 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634–35 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
48 Id. at 636, 638. 
49 Id. at 635–36. 
50 Id. at 634–36. 
51 Id. at 636. 
52 Id. at 645. 
 2009] REALIGNING INCENTIVES IN THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY    23 
allege that the ratings of the NPF XII notes were published to the investing 
public at large.”53  Citing Dun & Bradstreet for the proposition that speech 
to “a specific business audience” does not qualify as a matter of public 
concern, the court rejected the agencies’ First Amendment arguments.54  
The plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation and other claims thus survived 
the motion to dismiss.55 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The impact of these decisions will be felt more in structured finance 
than in corporate finance.  Many RMBS and virtually all CDOs are sold in 
private placements.56  In contrast, private placements in the United States 
of “plain vanilla” debt amounted to less than ten percent of total U.S. 
investment-grade corporate debt issuances in 2006.57 
Some may criticize the constitutional merits of the opinions, as ratings 
of bonds purchased by institutions that represent thousands of individual 
investors are arguably more a matter of public concern than the financial 
health of a small local company.  But irrespective of the constitutional 
merits of their rulings, the courts have hit upon a potentially happy 
compromise between exposing rating agencies to excessively burdensome 
costs, and holding them to account where their conflicts of interest are 
most severe and the potential adverse impact of inflated ratings on the 
financial system most pernicious.  While the courts’ reasoning was entirely 
distinct from the policy issues outlined above, they fortuitously, if 
imperfectly, deny full First Amendment protection to a broad swath of 
structured finance deals, which are largely sold in private placements, 
while preserving it for most of corporate finance, where public offerings 
constitute the bulk of the market.  Given the theoretical and practical 
difficulties of effecting a comprehensive solution to the misaligned 
incentives in the credit rating industry, this outcome marks a positive, if 
incremental, step in the right direction. 
                                                                                                                          
53 Id. at 640. 
54 Id. at 640 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)). 
55 Id. at 656.  The other claims to survive included violations of blue sky laws and aiding and 
abetting fraud. 
56 See Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, The Ratings Charade, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, July 
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/ratings.html. 
57 See THOMSON REUTERS, DEBT CAPITAL MARKETS REVIEW, US INVESTMENT GRADE 
CORPORATE DEBT (F9) (Fourth Quarter 2007), available at http://online.thomsonreuters.com/ 
DealsIntelligence/Content/Files/4Q07_Debt_Capital_Markets_R1.pdf (providing a total industry debt 
of $935,191,700,000 for 2006); THOMSON REUTERS, US PRIVATE PLACEMENTS REVIEW, PLAIN 
VANILLA DEBT EXCLUDING REG. S (AN 10) (Second Half 2007), available at http://online. 
thomsonreuters.com/DealsIntelligence/Content/Files/4Q07_Private_Placement.pdf (providing a total 
industry plain vanilla debt of $44,225,200,000 for 2006). 
